INTRODUCTION

1
Water resources are under increasing pressure due to demographic, socioeconomic and environmental 2 factors such as accelerated population growth, rapid urbanization, unsustainable consumption 3 patterns, depletion and pollution of aquifers and more extreme environmental fluctuations due to the 4 climatic consequences of global warming (Bates et al. 2008) . In this scenario, the timely detection of 5 pipe burst events in Water Distribution System (WDS) may enable the water companies to save large 6 amounts of water and hence postpone or avoid the need to develop new resources in order to meet 7 demand. The timely detection of pipe burst events in WDS also provides opportunities for water 8 companies to save money, reduce their carbon footprint, achieve higher levels of operational 9 efficiency and improve their customer service. 10 Despite all the past advances in pipe burst event detection methods since their introduction in the mid 11
1950s (Puust et al. 2010) , there is still a need to further improve the efficiency and reliability of these 12 methods. There is also a need to develop new and more effective burst event detection methodologies. 13 Equipment-based methods, such as leak noise correlators (Grunwell and Ratcliffe 1981) and pig-14 mounted acoustic sensing (Mergelas and Henrich 2005) are very effective in detecting pipe bursts and 15 their technology has been improved considerably over the last few years. They are, however, 16 expensive, labour-intensive, slow to run and may require the cessation of pipeline operations for long 17 as they are collected or at longer intervals (e.g., every 30 minutes), to improve sensor battery life. 1 Also, data from different sensors is usually not synchronised in time. 2
The data processing in the ERS starts by receiving the data communicated by the DMA sensors. For 3 each signal and at each communication interval u readings are obtained (e.g., 2 readings -assuming 4 15 minute sampled data, which are communicated every 30 minutes). These readings update a time 5 series record which is stored in the Time Series database. Once the data from all the DMA 6 pressure/flow sensors are fully processed as described below, the resulting u probability values that an 7 event has occurred in the DMA and any additional information that may be used to perform a 8 diagnosis of the incident occurring (e.g., to determine the likely cause of an alarm) are stored in the 9
Alarms database. If any of the u probability values exceed a fixed detection threshold an alarm is 10 generated. 11 Figure 1 to appear here. 12 The developed ERS enables event detection by performing the following three basic actions: (1) 13 "capture" (i.e., learn/estimate) the expected patterns of the pressure/flow signals assuming that no 14 event occurred in the DMA being studied -i.e. the Normal Operating Patterns (NOPs), (2) identify 15 and estimate the event induced deviations between observed and "captured" DMA signal patterns, and 16 (3) infer the probability that an event has occurred in the DMA based on the identified deviations. 17 Figure 1 shows a diagrammatic representation of the ERS. As it can be observed, the three basic 18 a particular event, and (b) enabling the identification of the deviations caused by different event types 1 -each analysis subsystem looks at a particular deviation indicator that is more suitable than the others 2 for identifying the deviations caused by a particular event type (e.g., the DBA and BBA subsystems are 3 more suitable for sudden pipe burst events while the TBA subsystem is more suitable for gradually 4 developing events such as pipe bursts developing gradually from background leaks). Finally, the fifth 5 ERS subsystem is used to perform the third basic action mentioned above (i.e., event probability 6 inference). Further details about the ERS subsystems and the associated modules can be found in the 7 following sections. 8 Figure 1 also shows that the ERS has two main modes of operation, the "Assemble" mode and the 9 "Execute" mode. The "Assemble" mode is used for 'tuning' the data-driven ERS when it is initialised 10 (i.e., used for the first time in a DMA). Later on, it is used: (i) regularly (e.g., weekly) when the ERS 11 is updated (to capture the latest normal operating conditions of a DMA) thereby providing a 12 continuously adaptive ERS, and (ii) periodically when the ERS is reinitialised (following occasional 13 operational/other DMA changes -e.g., re-valving). The "Execute" mode is the normal operating mode 14 used at every communication interval to detect the events occurring and raise the alarms. 15
Setup Subsystem
16
Subsystem overview 17 The objective of the Setup subsystem is to perform initial data processing and "capture" different 18 types of information about the NOP of the DMA signal being analysed. The data analyses in this 19 subsystem are organised into five modules: (1) data retrieval module, (2) data pre-processing module, 20 (3) statistics estimation module, (4) data de-noising module, and (5) ANN prediction model training 21
Time Series database and assembling a set of pressure/flow data that best represents the most recent 23 NOP of the DMA signal being analysed (i.e., 'NOP data set'). The latter is then further processed in 24 the third module to estimate several vectors of descriptive statistics (i.e., averages and standard 25 deviations). These vectors provide a basic statistical information about the DMA signal NOP. The 26 fourth module is used to remove the noise from the 'NOP data set'. At the end, the fifth module builds 27 the ANN model for the short-term prediction of future DMA signal data. As this ANN prediction 28 model assumes that no event occurred in the DMA being studied, it provides a model-based 29 information about the DMA signal NOP. As can be observed from Figure 1 , the Setup subsystem runs 30 in the "Assemble" mode when the ERS is (re)initialised, and periodically updated (i.e., every l days -31 e.g., every 7 days). 32
Data retrieval module
1
This module is used for retrieving, for the DMA signal being analysed, of m days (e.g., 14 days) of 2 past raw data (i.e., 'raw historical data set') from the Time Series database. The m-day 'raw historical 3 data set' is then passed on to this subsystem's data pre-processing module (see Figure 1) . 4
Data pre-processing module 5 This module is used for assembling the 'NOP data set'. This is achieved by using a two step 6 procedure. The first step involves: (i) checking and correcting erroneous timestamps, (ii) creating a 7 uniformly spaced time series, (iii) replacing blank entries with missing value indicators (NAN -'not a 8 number'), (iv) assigning Time of the Day (TofD) (i.e., a value between 1 and g, where 1 corresponds 9 to midnight and g is the number of samples in one day) and Day of the Week (DofW) (i.e., a value 10 between 1 and 7) values to each measurement, (v) rearranging the resulting m-day time series into m 11 vectors (i.e., one vector for each day with g pressure/flow values), (vi) using a heuristics-based 12 procedure to discard vectors containing large chunks of missing data, and (vii) using the linear 13 interpolation to fill in the missing values in each of the remaining vectors (i.e., 'valid' days). As a 14 result, an n-day 'repaired historical data set' is obtained. The second step involves gradually filtering 15 out (from the 'repaired historical data set') outliers and measurements that are not consistent with the 16 expected pressure/flow variations assuming that no event occurred in the DMA. This is achieved by 17 using three statistical tests applied in sequence. 18
In the first statistical test, considering that each of the n vectors in the 'repaired historical data set' can 19 be represented as ‫ݔ(‬ ଵ , ‫ݔ‬ ଶ ,…, ‫ݔ‬ ) where ݅ = 1: ݃ and ݆ = 1: ݊, a vector of 'daily' averages ‫̅ݔ(‬ ଵ , 20 ‫̅ݔ‬ ଶ ,…, ‫̅ݔ‬ ) and a vector of 'daily' standard deviations (ߪ ଵ , ߪ ଶ ,…, ߪ ) are computed. Then, each ‫ݔ‬ 21 value is checked to see if it falls inside the interval ‫̅ݔ(‬ − ܰ ଵ ೞ ߪ , ‫̅ݔ‬ + ܰ ௨ଵ ೞ ߪ ), where ܰ ଵ ೞ and 22 ܰ ௨ଵ ೞ are user defined multipliers denoting the acceptable lower and upper confidence limits. If ‫ݔ‬ is 23 outside these limits the entire j vector is discarded. As a result the number of 'valid' days may be 24 reduced from n to p. lower control limits at a user defined number ܰ ଶ and ܰ ௨ଶ of standard deviations from the centre 31 line. The standard deviation is estimated by taking the average of the p 'valid' days standard 32 deviations. If ߤ is an outlier of the range defined by the upper and lower control limits, the k th day is 33 7 ANN prediction model (Romano et al. 2010a ). Also, de-noising of a pressure/flow signal can be 1 performed without compromising its non-stationary or transitory characteristics, which are of 2 particular importance in anomaly detection (especially when the de-noising of the data coming on-line 3 is considered). Unlike Fourier analysis which consists of breaking up a signal into sine waves of 4 various frequencies, Wavelet Analysis breaks up a signal into scaled (i.e., stretched/compressed) and 5 shifted (i.e., delayed/hastened) versions of the original (or mother) wavelet. This dual frequency-time 6
representation allows noise to be removed from signal frequencies that are likely to contain important 7 information. 8 The conceptual details of the de-noising procedure applied here can be found in The resulting 'de-noised NOP data set' is then passed on to the ANN training & testing module. 17
Additionally, the Universal Threshold (computed and used in this module) is then passed on to the 18 data de-noising module of the DBA subsystem where it will be repeatedly used for removing noise 19 from the DMA signal data coming on-line (see Figure 1) . 20 The ANN prediction model training set consists of a subset (i.e., Train% -e.g. 80%) of the 'de-noised 11 NOP data set'. The remaining data (i.e., Test%) form the test set which is used to evaluate the 12 performance of the ANN prediction model. The goodness-of-fit measure used here is the Nash-13
ANN training & testing module
Sutcliffe index (Nash and Sutcliffe 1970) . The closer the value of the Nash-Sutcliffe index to 1 the 14 better. 15 In this module, the discrepancies between the training set's observed and predicted values are used to 16 calculate the values of the mean ߤ ௧௦ and of the standard deviation ߪ ௧௦ . These values can be seen as 17 measures of the ANN model prediction error's variability and are hence passed on to the evidence 18 generation module of the DBA subsystem (see Figure 1) . In that module, they will be repeatedly used 19 for establishing the statistical limits within which the discrepancies between the DMA signal values 20 coming on-line and their ANN model predicted counterparts should lie assuming that no event has 21 occurred in the DMA being studied. 22
Additionally, the trained and tested ANN prediction model is passed on to the ANN forecasting 23 module of the DBA subsystem (see Figure 1) . In that module, it will be repeatedly used together with 24 the DMA signal data coming on-line for performing one-step ahead predictions of the future DMA 25 signal values. 26
Discrepancy Based Analysis Subsystem
27
Subsystem overview
28
The DBA subsystem is the first of the three ERS subsystems that aim at performing deviations 29 identification and estimation. It provides a first way of doing this, which is based on the information 30 about the NOP of the DMA signal being analysed "captured" by means of the ANN prediction model 31 trained and tested in the Setup subsystem. Specifically, it checks that the discrepancies between the 32 incoming observed DMA signal values and their ANN predicted counterparts do not exceed predefined limits based on the estimated measures of the ANN model prediction error's variability (i.e., 1 ߤ ௧௦ and ߪ ௧௦ ). This way, it focuses on the identification of the pressure/flow deviations induced by 2 sudden events and it can identify small to large deviations. As a matter of fact, the size of the 3 minimum identifiable deviation is theoretically of the same order of magnitude as ߪ ௧௦ . Because of all 4 this, the DBA subsystem is particularly well suited for identifying the beginning and end of an event. 5
The data analyses in this subsystem are organised into four modules: (1) data retrieval module, (2) 6 data de-noising module, (3) ANN forecasting module, and (4) evidence generation module. The first 7 two modules are used for retrieving from the Time Series database and de-noising the DMA signal 8 data coming on-line. Then, the third module is used for performing one-step ahead prediction of the 9
DMA signal values. Finally, the fourth module is used for: (i) comparing the incoming observed 10
DMA signal values to the signal values predicted by the ANN model, (ii) identifying/estimating 11 significant (i.e., indicative of an event occurrence) discrepancies between those values, and (iii) 12 further processing the identified discrepancies to provide reliable evidence of an event occurrence. As 13 can be observed from Figure 1 , this subsystem runs in the "Execute" mode every a minutes (e.g., 14
every 30 minutes -depending on the data communication frequency). 15 values forms the 'raw incoming data set', which is then passed on to this subsystem's data de-noising 32 module (see Figure 1) . 33
Data retrieval module
Data de-noising module 1
This module is used for removing noise from the 'raw incoming data set' while preserving and 2 isolating the characteristics of an event occurring. This is achieved by using the same procedure and 3 de-noising threshold described/computed in the data de-noising module of the Setup subsystem. The 4 reason for using that de-noising threshold is that it is based on the 'NOP data set', therefore it is 5 "tailored" to the noise level assuming that no event occurred in the DMA being studied. The resulting 6
'de-noised incoming data set' is then passed on to the ANN forecasting module (see Figure 1) . 7 for detecting 'out of control' situations is used here: (i) if any discrepancy falls outside the ±4ߪ ௧௦limit, (iii) if four out of five consecutive discrepancies fall above the +2ߪ ௧௦ limit or below the −2ߪ ௧௦ 1 limit, and (iv) if eight consecutive discrepancies fall above the +1ߪ ௧௦ limit or below the −1ߪ ௧௦ limit. 2
ANN forecasting module
The modified set of Control Rules was identified after relevant sensitivity analysis (Romano et al. 3 2010b) . The same analysis also tested different types of comparative variables and concluded that the 4 discrepancy shown above generated the best event detection results. 5
The above Control Rules are applied to each discrepancy and a number of Control Rule violations is 6 determined. This number is then classified as follows: (i) high (3 or 4 violations), (ii) moderate (1 or 2 7 violations), or (iii) none (0 violations). 8
Boundary Based Analysis Subsystem
9
Subsystem overview 10 The BBA subsystem is the second of the three ERS subsystems that aim at performing deviations 11 identification and estimation. It provides another, second way of doing this based on the basic 12 statistical information about the DMA signal NOP "captured" in the Setup subsystem. Specifically, it 13 checks that the incoming observed signal values lie inside a "data envelope" whose boundaries are 14 defined by using the vectors of descriptive statistics estimated from the 'NOP data set' (i.e., 'NOP 15 average day' and 'NOP daily standard deviations' vectors). Similarly to the DBA subsystem, this 16 subsystem focuses on the identification of the pressure/flow deviations induced by sudden events. 17
However, it can only identify medium to large deviations. Indeed, at each time step (i.e., a particular 18 TofD), the magnitude of the minimum identifiable deviation is theoretically of the same order of 19 magnitude as three times the corresponding standard deviation value in the relevant 'NOP daily 20 standard deviations' vector (see this subsystem's evidence generation module). Despite this, it 21 complements the DBA subsystem by providing further evidence of an event occurrence. This is 22 because, by analysing the incoming observed DMA signal values as described above, this subsystem 23 has the potential to enable identifying deviations throughout the duration of an event. The data 24 analyses in this subsystem are organised into two modules: (1) data retrieval module, and (2) evidence 25 generation module. The first module is used for retrieving the incoming DMA signal data from the 26 Time Series database. Then, the second module is used for: (i) checking whether the incoming 27 observed DMA signal values lie inside the aforementioned statistical boundaries, (ii) 28 identifying/estimating the event-induced excursions outside those boundaries, and (iii) further 29 processing the identified excursions to provide reliable evidence of an event occurrence. As it can be 30 observed from Figure 1 , this subsystem also runs in the "Execute" mode every a minutes. 31
Data retrieval module
For the same reason given in the section describing the data retrieval module of the DBA subsystem 1 with regard to the value of b, the value of c is determined automatically by the ERS. However, it only 2 depends on: (i) the maximum number of consecutive time steps analysed in this subsystem's evidence 3 generation module, and (ii) the number of time steps considered by the Signal level BIS and DMA 4 level BIS modules in the Inference subsystem. This set of values forms the 'incoming data set' which 5 is then passed on to this subsystem's evidence generation module (see Figure 1) . 6
Evidence generation module 7 The objectives of this module are identical to the objectives of the evidence generation module of the 8 DBA subsystem. However, the way these are achieved is as follows. 9
Firstly, data analyses are performed to check whether each DMA signal value in the 'incoming data 10 set' exceeds the statistical boundaries. As each DMA signal value has an associated TofD and DofW, 11 these boundaries are computed by using the corresponding values of the average, ߤ , and of the 12 standard deviation, ߪ , in the relevant 'NOP average day' and 'NOP daily standard deviations ' 13 vectors. Specifically, the boundaries are defined as ߤ ± ܰߪ , where ܰ is a user defined multiplier. 14 Once this is done, the identified excursions outside the statistical boundaries are identified/estimated 15 and analysed in successive time steps using SPC-based Control Rules. Next, the number of Control 16 Rule violations is classified into three categories and the resulting vector of evidence forwarded as an 17 input into the relevant BIS modules of the Inference subsystem (see Figure 1 ).values fall above the +3ߪ boundary or below the −3ߪ boundary, and (iv) eight consecutive 23 observed values fall above the +3ߪ boundary or below the −3ߪ boundary. 24
Trend Based Analysis Subsystem
25
Subsystem overview
26
The TBA subsystem is the last of the three ERS subsystems that aim at performing deviations 27 identification and estimation. It provides a further way of doing so which is neither dependent on the test (similar to the first and third statistical tests described in the data pre-processing module of the 27 Setup subsystem) is performed by using ܰ ସ and ܰ ௨ସ as user defined multipliers. The rationale for 28 using only one statistical test is allowing more variability in the assembled data set. The resulting 29 'NOP d-hour window data set' is then passed on to this subsystem's evidence generation module (see 30 Inference System module, and (2) DMA level Bayesian Inference System module. In these two 25 modules all the generated evidence of an event occurrence at hand are combined to infer the 26 probability that an event has occurred in the DMA, raise detection alarms, and provide additional 27 information that may allow performing diagnosis of the event occurring. As it can be observed from 28 
Signal level Bayesian Inference System module
30
The objective of this module are: (a) to calculate, at each time step during the data communication 31 interval, the probability that an event has occurred (i.e., Signal level event occurrence probability) 32 based on the evidence resulting from the three ERS analysis subsystems (see Figure 1) , and (b) toprovide, at each time step during the data communication interval, a measure of the pressure/flow 1 deviation from the NOP of the DMA signal being analysed "captured" by means of the basic 2 descriptive statistics in the Setup subsystem. These objectives are achieved by: (i) using a Bayesian 3 Network (BN) (Edwards 2000) for performing inference, and (ii) estimating the difference between an 4 observed DMA signal value and its corresponding value in the relevant 'NOP average day' vector. 5
Note that the latter measure of deviation may be used (after a detection alarm is raised -see the DMA 6 level BIS section) to evaluate the likely event magnitude (e.g., burst flow). The module's output is 7 then stored in the Alarms database. 8
A BN is used for achieving this module's first objective because it allows reasoning under 9 uncertainty. A BN is ideally suited for situations that require combining multiple inputs in order to 10 infer a meaningful (probabilistic) output for decision-making. Furthermore, it allows updating the 11 probability of an outcome (e.g., event occurrence) as evidence accumulates. With enough evidence, it 12 should become very high or very low. This said, the structure of the Signal level BIS is designed here 13 in such a way that it is able to not only process synergistically the evidence from the different ERS 14 analysis subsystems (i.e., DBA/BBA/TBA) but also to encode the temporal sequence of the incoming 15 data. The latter is achieved by considering the event occurrence evidence relative to a number of time 16 steps, z, which, in turn, allows reasoning over time by updating the probability of an event occurrence 17 over consecutive time steps. 18 Although this module is not used to raise the detection alarms, it provides information that may be 19 used in the diagnosis of an event occurring. In fact, it allows the user to assess the extent to which the 20 particular signal has contributed to the generated alarm. The latter is particularly useful because it 21 may allow the user of the ERS: (1) to identify the area of the network that has been affected the most 22 by the event, and (2) to determine the likely cause of the event (e.g., faulty sensor or failure of a 23 pressure modulating valve). 24
DMA level Bayesian Inference System module
25
The main objective of this module is to raise detection alarms at the DMA level if and when 26 necessary. Similarly to the Signal level BIS, a BN which encodes the temporal sequence of the 27 incoming data is used for inferring, at each time step during the data communication interval, the 28 probability that an event has occurred (i.e., DMA level event occurrence probability). The main 29 difference is that the DMA level BIS takes as an input the evidence resulting from the different ERS 30 analysis subsystems coming simultaneously from all the DMA signals (see Figure 1) . It has to be 31 stressed that, by enabling the processing of all the event occurrence evidence available in a synergistic 32 way it is expected that the ERS will be able to increase its efficiency and reliability of detecting theoccurrence of an event in the DMA being studied. Finally, a detection alarm is generated when the 1 DMA level event occurrence probability goes above a user defined detection threshold (λ). 2
In addition to the above DMA level event occurrence probability, the DMA level BIS also calculates 3 the event occurrence probabilities based on: (i) the evidence from the DBA subsystems only, (ii) the 4 evidence from the BBA subsystems only, and (iii) the evidence from the TBA subsystems only. These 5 three additional event occurrence probabilities can help evaluate the extent to which a particular type 6 of analysis has contributed to generate an alarm and, for example, identify the event as a growing 7 rather than a sudden pipe burst. 8
Once a detection alarm is raised, it is stored in the Alarms database and the following information is 9 saved: (i) the DMA location, (ii) the DMA level event occurrence probability, (iii) the event 10 occurrence probabilities for each type of analysis performed (i.e., short-term DBA and BBA, and long-11 term TBA), and (iv) the detection alarm start time. Note that, in order to avoid raising unnecessary 12 alarms for the same event in the future, the ERS simply suppresses any further detection alarm for the 13 user specified 'alarm inactivity time' (e.g., 1 week). 14 Note that although historical data were used for the data analyses performed here, the pressure and 4 flow measurements were fed to the ERS in a simulated 'on-line' fashion (i.e., as the ERS would have 5 been used in real-life). Table 1 summarises the user defined ERS parameters used for the case study 6 analyses. 7 Table 1 . to appear here. 8
CASE STUDY ANALYSES
Engineered Burst Events
9
In the analyses carried out here, the methodology behind the ERS was tested and verified on the EEs 10 where pipe burst events were simulated by opening fire hydrants in the DMA being studied. This way, 11 all "burst" related information (location, timing and approximate flow rate) was known which, in turn, 12 enabled the evaluation of the methodology's performance based on comparisons between the ERS 13 detection times and the corresponding actual hydrant opening times. In addition to this, the Receiver 14
Operating Characteristics (ROC) graph (Egan 1975 opened achieving different flow rates. Note that any single EE lasted one day maximum and that 22 different EEs were sometimes carried out during the same week. Having said this, the 'alarm 23 inactivity time' parameter had to be chosen carefully. Choosing it as one week, for example, would 24 have implied that only one alarm could have been raised for multiple EEs carried out during the same 25 week. Thus, for the purposes of the analyses that evaluated the capabilities of the event detection 26 methodology based on comparisons between the detection times and the corresponding actual hydrant 27 opening times, it was set as equal to 1 day. 28 Table 2 shows the detection times obtained and the corresponding actual hydrant opening and closing 29 times for all the EEs. The actual flow rates and their corresponding values estimated by the ERS are 30 also given together with the values of the actual flow rate expressed as percentage of the average 31 DMA inflow. It can be observed that all EEs were successfully detected. The underlined alarm start 32 times refer to those events that were detected at the best possible time (within the 15-minute samplingrate). Alarm start times in normal font refer to those events that were detected with a delay not greater 1 than one hour, whilst alarm start times in bold refer to those events that were detected with delays 2 longer than 1 hour. The main reason for the comparatively long delay in detection for the EE carried 3 out on the 1 st of March 2010 is that the DMA pressure signals were only mildly affected by this event 4
(most likely due to the location of the hydrant opened being far away from the pressure sensors). As a 5 result, until late evening that day (when the "legitimate" variability in pressure/flow became less 6 accentuated), the pieces of event-occurrence evidence generated by the three ERS analysis subsystems 7
were not sufficient to produce a DMA level event occurrence probability greater than the user defined 8 detection threshold (i.e., greater than 0.5) and hence trigger an alarm. With regard to the 9 comparatively long delay in detection for the EE carried out on the 2 nd of March 2010, on the other 10 hand, note that only 10 minutes separate this EE from the EE carried out on the 1 st of March 2010. 11 Therefore, with the relevant value for the 'alarm inactivity time' parameter, it was not possible to 12 correctly identify its start time although the ERS generated a DMA level event occurrence probability 13 of 0.68 at 08:00 that day (i.e., detection at the best possible time). The results obtained confirm that 14 the event detection methodology presented here can effectively detect burst events. Furthermore they 15
show that timely detections are achieved (i.e., within one hour for all but one of the simulated burst 16 events). 17 Table 2 . to appear here. 18
As an example, Figure 2 shows the results obtained by the ERS when the first engineered event is 19 considered. Note that only the trend of the flow signal is shown in the figure. In this figure the vertical 20 axis on the right shows the DMA level event occurrence probability (i.e., a value between 0 and 1). 21
The leftmost vertical line indicates the time the detection alarm was raised and the vertical light bars 22 (i.e., P global) indicate the DMA level event occurrence probability (i.e., only if greater than the user 23 defined detection threshold, λ -i.e., greater than 0.5) at every time step (i.e., every 15 minutes). The 24 rectangle in the top of part of the figure represents the duration of the EE. 25 Figure 2 . to appear here. 26
For the purposes of the analyses that evaluated the capabilities of the event detection methodology 27 using the ROC graph and the AUC value, the value of the 'alarm inactivity time' parameter was set as 28 equal to 15 minutes (i.e., all the DMA level event occurrence probabilities greater than λ raised 29 detection alarms). This is because true and false alarm rates are obtained by comparison, at every time 30 step, between the status of the hydrant (i.e., hydrant opened/hydrant closed) and the output of the 31 DMA level BIS (i.e., DMA level event occurrence probability greater/smaller than λ). Results 32 obtained for the three months studied were considered as a single set of data. Then, because the exacthydrants' opening and closing times were known, a target vector consisting of a binary value (i.e., 1 hydrant opened/hydrant closed) for each time step was associated to it. 2 Figure 3 shows the ROC curve for the three month data set. The figure also shows the detection 3 threshold values printed at the corresponding curve positions. The resulting ROC curve is a two-4 dimensional depiction of the DMA level BIS performance (i.e., trade-off between true and false alarm 5 rates). However, it is possible to reduce ROC performance to a single scalar value representing 6 expected performance by calculating the area under the ROC curve. In this case the calculated AUC 7 value is 0.88. The resulting ROC graph and its AUC value provide strong evidence of the good 8 classification performance of the DMA level BIS. 9
By observing Figure 3 , a few considerations about the choice of the best detection threshold value can 10 be made. On the one hand, choosing a low value for the detection threshold (e.g., 0.4) has the 11 potential to improve the methodology's sensitivity to the events. As an example, when the first EE 12 carried out in March is considered (i.e., the one detected with an eleven hour and forty five minutes 13 delay -see Table 2 ), a threshold value equal to 0.4 would have led to the detection of the simulated 14 burst event at the best possible time (not shown here). However, this choice would have led to raising 15 false alarms also. On the other hand, choosing a high value for the detection threshold (e.g., 0.6) 16 produces a false alarm rate close to zero but may have allowed detecting fewer events only. Based on 17 these observations, it is possible to state that a detection threshold value of 0.5 allows achieving good 18 detection performance (see also the results of the tests on the real-life events). However, it does not 19 represent the optimal choice. Therefore, the selection of the most suitable detection threshold value 20 has to be ultimately based on the operator's decision and remains subject to the operator's confidence 21 and expertise. In this scenario, the data analyses described above can be used to help the operator to 22 make more informed decisions. 23 Figure 3 . to appear here. 24
Real-Life Events
25
When the ERS was tested on real-life events the value of the 'alarm inactivity time' parameter was set 26 as equal to 1 week. With this setting, the ERS raised a total of 38 detection alarms. 27
In order to evaluate the performance of the developed methodology, the following data were 28 available: (i) Main Repair (MR) records from the Work Management System (WMS) database (i.e., 29 containing records of repairs carried out in the network), and (ii) Customer Contacts (CCs) records 30 (i.e., customer complaints about potential problems related to water supply). The 17 MR records in 31 the analysed eleven month period were considered as an indication of the occurred burst events.1 date and time of these events could not be determined based on this information only. Therefore, a 2 careful visual inspection of the data (supported by the MR and CC records) was carried out in order to 3 determine their likely duration. This visual inspection of the data also allowed the identification of 7 4 clusters of CCs, which were not accompanied by any MR record. They were considered as an 5 indication of pressure/flow anomalies whose exact cause is uncertain (e.g., illegal water usage, 6 unusual system activity, operational DMA changes, etc.), but for which a record exist. Furthermore, it 7 allowed the identification of 1 sensor failure event (i.e., characterised by the distinctive trend 8 signature), and 5 other visible pressure/flow anomalies which were, however, not accompanied by any 9 CC or MR records (i.e., did not impact the customers). All these events formed the set of real-life 10 incidents against which the 38 detection alarms raised by the ERS were compared in order to see if a 11 correlation existed (i.e., genuine alarms) or not (i.e., false alarms). Figure 4 shows the results obtained 12 from this comparison. 13 Figure 4 . to appear here. 14 It is possible to observe from this figure that 21 alarms were correlated to the 17 burst events, 6 15 alarms were correlated to the pressure/flow anomalies that generated several CCs, 3 alarms were 16 correlated to the sensor failure event, 5 alarms were correlated to the 5 visible pressure/flow 17 anomalies that did not affect the customers, and 3 were false alarms. Note that because of the 'alarm 18 inactivity time' parameter used, multiple detection alarms were sometime related to the same events. 19
Furthermore, some event caused alarms in different DMAs. These results show that the event 20 detection methodology was able to detect all but one of the 30 real-life events identified by means of 21 the visual inspection of the data. Furthermore, it did so with a low false alarm rate (i.e., about 8%). It 22 is therefore possible to state that these early results point to the potential of the methodology 23 presented here to effectively and reliably detect pipe bursts and other real-life events. 24
It is worth noting that the alarm rates (false alarms in particular) and the detection times obtained by 25 using the methodology presented here on both engineered pipe burst events and real-life pipe 26 burst/other events should be, ideally, compared with corresponding results obtained by using other 27 methodologies available. and Boxall 2010) are more challenging than tests performed by using historical data/events. 5
Discussion
6
In the data pre-processing module of the Setup subsystem, outliers that are not related to bursts or 7 other events and that should really be part of the 'NOP data sets' may be eliminated, could render the 8 ERS detection framework more sensitive to the presence of such outliers (hereafter referred to as 9 'normal' outliers) in the observed data streams. This is because those pre-processed data series are 10 then employed to train the ANN models used in the DBA subsystem and to compute the relevant 11 statistics used in the BBA subsystem. Having said this, it can be noted that the 'normal' outliers 12 usually occur at random times and affect a single data point in time, as opposed to burst and other 13 events induced outliers that usually affect multiple, consecutive data points in time (and may exhibit 14 an identifiable or quantifiable pattern). Bearing this in mind, in the ERS, the potential false positive 15 alarms resulting from single outliers are reduced by using SPC Control Rules to analyse the incoming 16 data over consecutive time steps. Indeed, by using these rules, persistent outliers have a greater 17 chance of triggering an alarm than single outliers. Additionally, in the ERS, the potential false 18 positive alarms resulting from single outliers are further reduced by using the DMA level BIS, via 19 event occurrence evidence processing and the use of a threshold on estimated event occurrence 20
probabilities. 21
In addition to the above, it could also be argued that the persistent outliers themselves may not be 22 related to events that are of interest for water companies (e.g., bursts, sensor faults, illegal 23 consumptions, etc.) and that should really be part of the NOP data set. These may be due to 24 increased/decreased consumption during a very hot day, an holyday or a special occasion such as a 25 big sport event in town, for example. At the present, the ERS does not account for these situations 26 (although this would be possible and could be quite straightforward -e.g., information about holydays 27 might be considered when assembling the NOP data sets and/or as an extra input to the ANN 28 prediction model and/or as an extra input to the Bayesian Inference Systems -BISs). As a 29 consequence, such outliers might trigger detection alarms. Bering this in mind, it is worth mentioning 30 that the aforementioned situations would likely result in a number of alarms being simultaneously 31 raised in multiple DMAs that cannot however be affected by the same local anomaly (e.g., a burst). 32
Therefore, following aposteriory analysis of the raised alarms (e.g., by means of an additional ERS 33 module or manually by the operator) it could be possible to attribute the cause of the alarms to some with the events identified by visual inspection of the data.
